1,449 research outputs found
Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly where primary users allow secondary
access in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission qualities of the
licensed bands fluctuate randomly. Each primary needs to select the price of
its channel with the knowledge of its own channel state but not that of its
competitors. Secondaries choose among the channels available on sale based on
their states and prices. We formulate the price selection as a non-cooperative
game and prove that a symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy profile exists
uniquely. We explicitly compute this strategy profile and analytically and
numerically evaluate its efficiency. Our structural results provide certain key
insights about the unique symmetric NE.Comment: Presented in ISIT' 2013, Istanbul Version 2 contains some modified
versions of proofs of version 1. In IEEE Proceedings of International
Symposium on Information Theory, 201
Quality Sensitive Price Competition in Spectrum Oligopoly:Part 1
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their
channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality
of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would
quote without knowing the transmission qualities of its competitors' channels.
Each secondary buys a channel depending on the price and the transmission
quality a channel offers. We formulate the price selection problem as a non
co-operative game with primaries as players. In the one-shot game, we show that
there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium(NE) strategy profile and
explicitly compute it. Our analysis reveals that under the NE strategy profile
a primary prices its channel to render high quality channel more preferable to
the secondary; this negates the popular belief that prices ought to be selected
to render channels equally preferable to the secondary regardless of their
qualities. We show the loss of revenue in the asymptotic limit due to the non
co-operation of primaries. In the repeated version of the game, we characterize
a subgame perfect NE where a primary can attain a payoff arbitrarily close to
the payoff it would obtain when primaries co-operate.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 41
pages single column format.Conference version is available at arXiv:1305.335
Uncertain Price Competition in a Duopoly with Heterogeneous Availability
We study the price competition in a duopoly with an arbitrary number of
buyers. Each seller can offer multiple units of a commodity depending on the
availability of the commodity which is random and may be different for
different sellers. Sellers seek to select a price that will be attractive to
the buyers and also fetch adequate profits. The selection will in general
depend on the number of units available with the seller and also that of its
competitor - the seller may only know the statistics of the latter. The setting
captures a secondary spectrum access network, a non-neutral Internet, or a
microgrid network in which unused spectrum bands, resources of ISPs, and excess
power units constitute the respective commodities of sale. We analyze this
price competition as a game, and identify a set of necessary and sufficient
properties for the Nash Equilibrium (NE). The properties reveal that sellers
randomize their price using probability distributions whose support sets are
mutually disjoint and in decreasing order of the number of availability. We
prove the uniqueness of a symmetric NE in a symmetric market, and explicitly
compute the price distribution in the symmetric NE.Comment: 45 pages, Accepted for publication in IEEE Transaction on Automatic
Contro
HERA Constraint on Warped Quantum Gravity
We study recent data on deep inelastic e^+ p scattering at HERA to constrain
the parameters of a Randall-Sundrum-type scenario of quantum gravity with a
small extra dimension and a non-factorable geometry.Comment: 13 pages, LaTeX, 2 ps figures; reference added and minor errors
correcte
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